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PERFECTIONISM AND MAXIMUM CONSCIOUSNESS IN
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: A TRIBUTE TO JUDGE
BETTY B. FLETCHER
Norman W. Spaulding*
Abstract: What follows is a speech on the significance of Judge Betty Binns Fletcher’s
opinions in the area of race and anti-discrimination law delivered at the University of
Washington School of Law’s symposium, A Tribute to the Honorable Betty Binns Fletcher,
honoring Judge Fletcher’s thirtieth year on the bench. I argue that, in an era when the
Supreme Court has increasingly refused to recognize anti-discrimination claims, Judge
Fletcher’s intensely fact-sensitive method of deciding such cases is as important as the results
she has reached. Against the Supreme Court’s perfectionist jurisprudence, predicated on the
assumption that by excising race from law, one can eliminate discrimination in society, Judge
Fletcher has developed a jurisprudence of maximum consciousness, predicated on the
assumption that judicial officers are obliged by the Fourteenth Amendment and our history to
remain acutely aware of the risk of slippage between seemingly rational, neutral social action
and irrational stereotype, cognitive bias, and animus.

I am honored to have the invitation to speak about Judge Betty
Fletcher. I should say up front that I am not an empiricist. My method of
reflecting on the Judge’s decisions on race and the law is the fruit of an
impressionistic doctrinal survey, supplemented by something like
reverse autobiographical free association. I am not an anti-discrimination
expert either, though I have followed some of the doctrine in this area
with interest. It is also possible and perhaps more honest to say that antidiscrimination law brought me to law school, though not in any
conventional sense. I have not told this story to the Judge before, but I
am prompted by reading her cases on race to share it now.
My parents are mixed. My mother is lily white, grew up in a small
New England town. My father is black, grew up on the South Side of
Chicago. Spauldings, black Spauldings, have always been mixed.
Family records go back to North Carolina in the early 1800s and a series
of interracial encounters: between a white plantation owner and his
slave, the Indian woman the slave married, and the son of the plantation
owner who freed the slave by formal court petition in 1825. The slave,
* Nelson Bowman Sweitzer & Marie B. Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, and law
clerk to Judge Betty B. Fletcher, 1999–2000. I would like to thank Trevor Morisson for the
invitation to give this speech, Samantha Bateman and Caroline Jackson for excellent assistance with
research, and the editors of the University of Washington Law Review for agreeing to and assisting
in its publication.
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Benjamin Spaulding, was born in Duplin County in 1773. Deed records
show him owning property as early as 1817, and the 1820 census lists
him as a “free man of color,” so the later court petition merely may have
recognized a prior understanding between master and slave.1 Benjamin
Spaulding and his wife Edith had ten children, and those children
eventually married Indians, whites, and other blacks.2
So, a complicated history of miscegenation was in place long before
my parents met in college and decided to marry. Still their choice was
not easy. They married within a year of the Supreme Court decision in
Loving v. Virginia.3 My mother’s family initially disowned her, and it
took years before many of them could even so much as meet my father’s
eye. My parents told me about Loving, and I remember feeling
dumbstruck by the idea that a law of any kind might have prevented my
parents’ marriage if they had lived in the wrong state. Even though the
decision struck down anti-miscegenation laws, the thought of it—of such
laws and of the need for judicial intervention in something so intimate,
so idiosyncratic, so private—provoked a kind of vertiginous feeling I
can now identify as bordering on the existential. The proximity between
law and my being, my parents’ well-being, was revealed in a way that
made my identity seem more fragile and contingent than I think any
child’s should.
If I had not already, at that moment, resolved to be a lawyer, to master
the thing that seemed then so opaque and powerful, meeting my father’s
friend, a black lawyer from Los Angeles who in the 1970s was working
entertainment deals with black musicians, sealed the deal. I have long
since lost the pre-release Stevie Wonder LP of Hotter Than July he gave
me for my ninth birthday, but the idea that law could offer access both to
the Constitution and racial equality on the one hand, and to Stevie
Wonder on the other, was too much to resist. My father’s friend was a
Porsche-driving Thurgood Marshall in my imagination, and the poorer
my family became, the more being a lawyer came to symbolize the
ultimate professional endeavor—justice, Rhythm & Blues, and a good
salary.
Those of you old enough to remember the Hotter Than July album
will perhaps understand how I conjured this fantastic mélange of social
justice and Motown professionalism. The song “Happy Birthday” on the
album was dedicated to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the sleeve liner
1. LOUIS D. MITCHELL & JOHN A. SPAULDING, A STORY OF THE DESCENDANTS OF BENJAMIN
SPAULDING (1773–1862) WITH GENEALOGY 29 (1989).
2. Id. at 30.
3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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featured a large photograph of Dr. King with text below making an
impassioned plea to make January 15th a national holiday in recognition
of “what he achieved and as a reminder of the distance which still has to
be traveled.”4 On the back of the sleeve liner was a collage of
photographs depicting bloody moments in the civil rights movement. In
the center is a shot of Dr. King walking, head up, leading a throng of
marchers. In my mind at the time, he seemed to be walking toward the
law, and it seemed that the vindication of his claims in the law would
draw the country out of the racial terror and chaos visible in the
surrounding shots.
I say all of this because, having been asked to talk about Judge
Fletcher’s influence in the area of race and the law, and in sitting down
to read her opinions stretching back thirty years, I have been struck anew
by the tension between what I then saw as the promise of civil rights
law, and what it has become. I was not naïve about the promise of law.
Loving taught me not that anti-miscegenation laws were
unconstitutional, but that they had been perfectly legal for three hundred
years of our history. Seeing my mother and father arrested on false
charges when our white landlord called the sheriff because my father
had the audacity to refuse to pay rent on grounds of the implied warranty
of habitability had already revealed the double-jointedness of formally
neutral legal rights and procedures, had already shown me how
discriminatory practices move in, through, and beyond legal categories
to find expression in and reinforce entrenched social norms.
But there was a real promise in the momentum depicted at the center
of the collage on the back of the sleeve liner, a sense that law could
vindicate justice, not just stand in the way. To identify law with the
photograph of King marching, as I did, rather than with the helmeted
white cops in the surrounding scenes of riot and bloodied black bodies,
was a promise in itself. The most ambitious term of the promise was that
in a constitutional democracy that rather embarrassingly came to have to
formally guarantee equal protection of the laws, the institutions of law
could work to make that guarantee something more than a glittering
constitutional generality.
The appointment of Judge Fletcher to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals was a manifestation of this promise, but we all know what
happened with anti-discrimination law in the Supreme Court in the
decades following.
In the area of school desegregation, the Court moved from conferring

4. STEVIE WONDER, HOTTER THAN JULY, Liner Notes (Motown Records 1980).
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generous discretion on lower courts to enter effective remedial decrees
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education5 in 1971 to a
series of more restrictive standards in Milliken v. Bradley I6 and II7 in the
mid-1970s and the Missouri v. Jenkins cases8 in 1990 and 1995, and
finally to striking down even voluntary desegregation decrees in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District9 in 2007.
In the area of affirmative action, the fairly narrow windows opened by
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke10 in 1978 and Fullilove
v. Klutznick11 in 1980 were closed in a series of decisions, most
prominently Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education12 in 1986, Richmond
v. Croson13 in 1989, and Adarand Constructors v. Pena14 in 1995, in

5. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (finding mathematical ratios of white to black students, grouping of noncontiguous school zones, and court-ordered busing to be appropriate measures falling within the
district courts’ broad remedial powers “to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of stateimposed segregation”).
6. 418 U.S. 717, 744–47 (1974) (holding that busing and other remedies could extend across
district lines only where there was actual evidence that multiple school districts had deliberately
engaged in a policy of segregation).
7. 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (approving a remedial plan going beyond pupil assignments because
the plan was “tailored” to cure the constitutional violation—Detroit’s de jure segregated school
system—and therefore did not exceed the violation).
8. 515 U.S. 70, 90, 93 (1995) (interpreting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to
deal only with de jure segregation, and striking down an order that aimed to correct de facto racial
inequality on the grounds that the lower courts had used improper guidelines to justify broad relief);
495 U.S. 33, 56–58 (1990) (holding that a district court had abused its discretion by imposing a
property tax increase in order to enhance the quality of local schools and thereby attract white
students from the suburbs).
9. 551 U.S. 701, 710–11, 747–48 (2007) (prohibiting the assignment of students to public schools
based upon racial classifications, even where the school district voluntarily adopted the plan in an
effort to achieve racial diversity); id. at 730–31 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) (refusing to recognize
racial balance as a compelling state interest).
10. 438 U.S. 265, 315–19 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (concluding that the use of rigid quota
systems in college admissions is impermissible, but upholding the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs that use race as a plus factor).
11. 448 U.S. 448, 482–92 (1980) (concluding that Congress need not act in a completely
colorblind manner when exercising its Spending Clause powers to remedy racial discrimination, and
upholding a 10% set-aside program for minority business enterprises as a constitutional exercise of
congressional authority).
12. 476 U.S. 267, 279–84 (1986) (striking down a provision in a teachers’ union collective
bargaining agreement that protected less-senior minorities from layoffs as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause).
13. 488 U.S. 469, 477–486, 498 (1989) (finding a “generalized assertion that there has been past
discrimination in an entire industry” to be an insufficient basis for remedial action, and holding
Richmond’s minority set-aside program, which reserved 30% of the city’s construction contracts for
minority business enterprises, unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); cf. Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990) (upholding, by a vote of 5–4, FCC policies giving preference
to minorities in the awarding of licenses and providing for “distress sales” to minority buyers
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which the Court insisted that even benign and remedial reliance on race
would be subjected to “the strictest judicial scrutiny.”15
In the area of Title VII and other litigation involving statutory civil
rights, the Court has eviscerated the continuing violation doctrine,
rigidly enforced statutes of limitation, and constrained remedies.16 Even
when Congress has used its enforcement powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments to expand statutory remedies for unequal
treatment, the Supreme Court has revived a robust antebellum federalism
doctrine as a limiting principle.17
In most of these areas, the case names alone resonate without
extended parenthetical elaboration. Reading Judge Fletcher’s antidiscrimination cases against the Supreme Court’s retreat from the
without FCC review because Congress has a legitimate interest in diversity in broadcasting and the
programs were narrowly tailored).
14. 515 U.S. 200, 224–27, 239 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications, including those
imposed by the federal government, are subject to strict scrutiny and that current disadvantage may
not be presumed based merely upon race or proof of past discrimination, remanding for review
under this standard a challenge to a financial incentive program in federal contracts for contractors
who hired minority subcontractors).
15. Id.; cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying a version of strict scrutiny to
affirmative action programs at colleges and universities); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(same).
16. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628–29 (2007) (barring a
female employee’s employment discrimination suit because it was not filed within the 180-day
statute of limitations period for Title VII claims); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 113 (2002) (limiting the continuing violation doctrine by holding that “discrete discriminatory
acts are not actionable if time-barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed
charges”); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002) (holding that
undocumented alien employees may not receive back pay as a remedy for their employers’
violations of the National Labor Relations Act).
17. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that sovereign immunity
principles inherent in the Eleventh Amendment protect state defendants against suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–27 (2000) (striking
down the Violence Against Women Act as an unconstitutional use of Congress’s remedial powers
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Act was not a congruent and
proportional remedy to gender-based discrimination by the states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 82–91 (2000) (concluding that Congress cannot constitutionally abrogate state
sovereign immunity to enforce rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because age
is not a suspect classification); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 643–47 (1999) (invalidating Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Patent Act because Congress had failed to identify a pattern of pervasive, unremedied
constitutional violations); cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516–34 (2004) (permitting
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Americans with Disabilities Act in limited
circumstances where the fundamental right of access to the courts was involved and there was a
sufficient record of the denial of that fundamental right to disabled individuals); Nev. Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–35 (2003) (allowing abrogation of sovereign immunity
under the Family and Medical Leave Act because gender-based discrimination receives heightened
scrutiny and the record established a history of such discrimination).
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promise of the second reconstruction, two things become very clear.
First, Judge Fletcher evinces a very different understanding of what that
promise was and what it called upon the judiciary to do. Second, despite
the Supreme Court’s retreat through the hypocrisy of “strict” scrutiny,
she has steadfastly insisted upon exercising meaningful judicial review
in anti-discrimination cases. The methodology of her analysis reflects
the highest standards of judicial integrity, independence, and fidelity to
the principle of due process. More importantly, it reflects one of the
animating principles of the second reconstruction—that law can be made
proprioceptive, by which I mean made aware of and responsive to its
own movement in, and influence on, social action.
First, with respect to the different understandings of what the second
reconstruction calls upon judges to do, I want to borrow a criticism
Ralph Ellison offers in a book review he wrote in 1945 of an anthology
of essays on race provocatively entitled Primer for White Folks.18
Ellison notes his disappointment that notwithstanding the sympathetic
attitude of many of the contributors regarding the problem of racism,
their normative stance avoids the threshold challenge racism presents to
our democratic legitimacy. The authors appear to fear genuine equality,
to want to believe that it already exists, or to displace responsibility for
bringing it about. As Ellison puts it:
Since hardly any aspect of our culture escapes the blight of
hypocrisy implicit in our social institutions, it is not surprising
that many of the pieces mix appeal for fair play with doubletalk; or that most are much too fearful of that absolute concept
“democracy,” circling above it like planes being forced to earth
in a fog. They seem concerned most often with patching up the
merry-go-round-that-broke-down than with the projection of that
oh-so-urgently-needed new American humanism.19
Patching up the merry-go-round that broke down. The metaphor
perfectly captures the position of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts on
race. The Court has been much more concerned with patching up neutral
constitutional principles, repairing the formal system of the Framers, and
protecting private and social institutions from judicial intervention, than
in practically securing the guarantee of equality. It has understood the
second reconstruction as a mandate to undo discrimination, but by way
of a foundational assumption that racism is an exceptional and

18. RALPH ELLISON, Beating That Boy, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH ELLISON 145
(1995).
19. Id. at 147.
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historically aberrant social practice readily overcome by eliminating race
as a legal category. In a word, it is a jurisprudence of perfectionism.
But if the basic promise of the second reconstruction is to humanize
the law of equality, to draw it away not only from state-sanctioned
subordination but also private subordination under the color of law, it
surely calls for a different kind of judicial review. Ellison was not
concerned with judicial review, but he was deeply concerned with the
kind of historical, moral, and practical consciousness that could move
the nation in a more democratic, by which he meant, at least in part,
more egalitarian, direction. And he believed that people of all colors
would have to make this shift in consciousness animated by a new
humanism. In another essay, one of his most elegant and provocative, he
describes the effect of this shift as a kind of “maximum
consciousness.”20
Maximum consciousness is a provocative term. Ellison uses it to
reveal one of the effects of comedy, quoting Kenneth Burke’s
observation that comedy can “enable us to be observers of ourselves
while acting. Its ultimate end would not be passiveness but maximum
consciousness. [It should allow] one to ‘transcend’ himself by noting his
own foibles . . . [and should] provide a rationale for locating the
irrational and the non-rational.”21 To this, Ellison, acutely aware of the
reversals in understanding of oneself and others that comedy makes
possible, adds, “[t]he greater the stress within society the stronger the
comic antidote required.”22
Judge Fletcher’s anti-discrimination decisions display the operation of
a kind of maximum consciousness. The method, if I may generalize, has
three key features: 1) a presumption that neither status nor circumstance
creates any immunity from anti-discrimination law; 2) an acute
awareness of social context, particularly the ubiquitous risk of slippage
between seemingly rational, neutral social action and irrational
stereotype or cognitive bias; and 3) exhaustive attention to factual
nuance.
From one of the Judge’s earliest opinions, a 1981 case holding that
black enlisted navy officers have a right under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents23 to judicial review of racial discrimination in duty
20. RALPH ELLISON, An Extravagance of Laughter, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH
ELLISON, supra note 18, at 613, 647.
21. Id.
22. Id. It is no accident that the essay from which this quote is drawn explores the place of
comedy in race relations.
23. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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assignments,24 to a case decided shortly after the 9/11 attacks in which
she upheld the right of a Lebanese school teacher to challenge her
suspension for false allegations that she made a bomb threat,25 the Judge
has been adamant that, with narrow exceptions, no social role is too
privileged and no emergency too dire to warrant immunity from
constitutional and statutory anti-discrimination guarantees. Judge
Fletcher was reversed in the navy officers’ case two years later, but the
Supreme Court had to duck inconvenient nineteenth-century case law in
order to conclude that superior military officers have a constitutionally
unique status.26
The Judge’s acute sensitivity to social context and the risk of
cognitive bias works in and through her attention to factual nuance. In
opinion after opinion, one sees painstaking, elaborately detailed review
of the record below. In the process, overt but overlooked or subtle biases
in the defendant employer’s decision making, or in the defendant public
institution’s policies, come sharply into relief. More than that,
unconscious biases and missteps in trial court decisions under review are
revealed. And one suspects that the Judge’s scrupulous attention to
context and factual nuance has the effect of checking even her own
presuppositions and the assumptions of her colleagues in conference.
Some of the most striking anti-discrimination cases the Judge has
decided involve the reversal of summary judgment or judgment as a
matter of law for defendants in Title VII cases. An apparently
compelling and legitimate non-discriminatory business reason suddenly
evaporates when a fact ignored or improperly dismissed by the trial
court is carefully extracted from the record to establish pretext. As the
Judge delicately admonished in a 1989 retaliation case:
As a summary procedure, a directed verdict should be used
judiciously, particularly in cases involving issues of motivation
or intent. An employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge requires
a determination of an employer’s true motivation, an elusive
factual question which is difficult to ascertain and generally
24. Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 730 n.1, 736 (9th Cir. 1981).
25. Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 n.2 (1983) (purporting to distinguish an 1851
case, Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. 89 (1851), in which the Supreme Court upheld a common law
cause of action by a marine against his commanding officer for damages suffered as a result of
punishment and illegal detention on board after the expiration of his term of enlistment). Judge
Fletcher later maintained that the Court had not fully reversed course in Chappell. See Gonzalez v.
Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Implicit in the court’s order of remand is the
recognition that, in some situations at least, uniformed members of the Armed Services may assert
that their constitutional and statutory rights have been violated by their superiors.”).
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unsuitable for summary disposition.27
This was a “delicate” admonition because in the preceding three-anda-half pages, the Judge offered a comprehensive reconstruction of
evidence indicating that the two black plaintiffs had been laid off within
weeks of filing EEOC discrimination charges by the very same company
officers whose actions had prompted the EEOC complaints, and that the
employees had been laid off on economic grounds when they had quite
heavy workloads while other employees were transferred in order to
avoid layoffs.28 Her opinion also takes four pages to individually review
and overturn the district court’s erroneous exclusion of relevant
evidence.29
In an era of appellate adjudication in which overloaded dockets have
inspired a new level of judicial imperialism and deference to managerial
district court judges,30 it is refreshingly retro-chic to see skepticism
about the legitimacy of pre-verdict disposition in factually controverted
cases. The point is not that all the plaintiffs were entitled to prevail, and I
don’t take that to have been the Judge’s point either. What is significant
is her disposition with respect to uncertainty, particularly uncertainty
regarding a social problem precious few are capable of admitting we still
have. Like Ellison, the Judge understands that we cannot locate the
irrational and the non-rational if we don’t bother to look.
Too few appellate judges order and review the entire record below for
each case they hear on appeal. But this simple practice, to which the
Judge religiously adheres, operates to forestall the seemingly irresistible
and ubiquitous temptation to conclude that racial motive is absent, to
believe that good intentions cannot be mixed with bad, to believe, in
short, the perfectionist thesis that we have overcome, or are on the verge
of overcoming, racial subordination.31 Maximum consciousness.
27. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted).
28. Id. at 503–06.
29. Id. at 511–15. In a 2002 case reversing summary judgment for the employer, she carefully
reviewed the record to show that the plaintiffs could not legitimately have been denied promotions
on the ground that they were not qualified when the employer had, over a period of years,
systematically excluded them from work details that would have given them the necessary training
and skills for the positions they were denied. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1115–16 (9th Cir.
2002).
30. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–53 (2009) (following the new
pleading standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and dismissing as implausible claims of
supervisory liability against government officers who allegedly designed a policy of targeting Arab
and Muslim men for detention and harsh treatment after the attacks of September 11, 2001); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–64 (2007) (rejecting the notice pleading standard of
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and adopting a new “plausibility” standard).
31. Or, as Justice O’Connor has suggested, that we shall have overcome it in twenty-five years.
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There is a deep humanism in the Judge’s method of maximum
consciousness as well. One could give many examples, for there are
many cases insightfully construing civil rights laws, and they are
regularly cited in other courts around the country.32 But the example I’d
like to give in closing is one I suppose most of us would consider an
unremarkable case.
Clement Sumner was a black postal worker fired for
insubordination.33 The trial court entered a defense verdict after a fiveSee Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
32. There are a number of examples in the area of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006) (citing Raad v. Fairbanks N. Starborough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d
1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (B. Fletcher, J.) (holding that discrimination in hiring can be found on
the basis of qualifications alone when the complaining applicant’s qualifications are “clearly
superior” to those of the selected job applicant—a more lenient standard than in some other
circuits)); Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing and following U.S. v.
Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (B. Fletcher, J.) (holding that, when alleging
discrimination in jury selection, “the fair cross-section claim does not require a showing that the
selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or not race-neutral; the defendant must only show that
the exclusion of his or her group is ‘systematic’”)); Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir.
2003) (citing and following B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t., 276 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (B.
Fletcher, J.) (authorizing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 contingent upon a finding of
recklessness or bad faith; allowing plaintiffs more leniency in pleading requirements for
discrimination claims, as “[c]omplainants filing discrimination charges are acting as laypersons and
should not be held to the higher standard of legal pleading by which [a court] would review a civil
complaint”)); O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing and
relying upon Pavon v. Swift, 192 F.3d 902, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1999) (B. Fletcher, J.) (holding that
compensatory damages awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are not subject to the statutory cap
contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3))).
In the area of anti-discrimination law more generally, Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir.
2000) (B. Fletcher, J.), adopted the EEOC’s definition of an “adverse employment action” under
Title VII—that is, that such action need not constitute an ultimate employment action, but may
instead constitute “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity,” with the severity of
the retaliatory action determining damages and not liability. 217 F.3d at 1242–43. Several courts
have cited and relied upon Henderson. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 61 (2006); Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2006); Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir. 2005); White v.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, 809 (6th Cir. 2004) (Clay, J., concurring); Gregory v.
Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001); Thomas v. Ragland, 324 F. Supp. 2d 950, 975 (W.D. Wis.
2004); Johnson v. Milwaukee Sch. of Eng’g, 258 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (E.D. Wis. 2003); Gonsalves
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P.3d 1196, 1209 (Haw. 2002); Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency,
Ltd., 32 P.3d 52, 69 (Haw. 2001); Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 679
(Iowa 2004); Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1044 (N.H. 2003). Another example in this
area is Yamaguchi v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (B. Fletcher,
J.), which held that employers are liable for employees’ harassing behavior if they know the conduct
is taking place and fail to take adequate remedial measures to address it. Yamaguchi was cited with
approval in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998).
33. Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1990) (B. Fletcher, J., sitting by
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day bench trial, stating that Sumner’s race discrimination claims were
“conclusory and generalized” and that he had failed to substantiate his
claim of retaliation.34 The case tracks an all-too-common workplace
pattern. Sumner is regularly given disproportionate sanctions for minor
infractions on the job. When he begins to complain, and to identify
preferential treatment given to white co-workers, inflated write-ups
escalate to suspensions. With a disciplinary record in place, one of his
former supervisors confronts Sumner over a trumped-up safety violation.
Sumner walks away, but is re-confronted, accused of insubordination,
and then fired.35
The evidence at trial showed that flagrant insubordination by white
employees was regularly overlooked, that the former supervisor accused
Sumner of having a “war-like attitude” but could only give as evidence
the fact that Sumner had complained about racial discrimination in the
distribution of assignments.36 Combined with the disputed safety
violation that might have been enough to reverse, but the Judge looked
even deeper, uncovering direct evidence of discrimination in the
testimony of another supervisor at the initial EEOC hearing. The
supervisor conceded that his boss “didn’t care for . . . Black, Hispanic,
and Latin background people.”37
Judge Fletcher reversed the judgment in the Sumner case, but what
strikes me about the opinion is less the result itself than the effect of the
careful narrative rendering of the workplace conflict. Sumner is freed
from the stereotype of the angry black employee, and seen instead as an
employee struggling to preserve his dignity in a racially charged
environment. When read against the context of the inflated prior writeups, the moment of confrontation between Sumner and his former
supervisor shifts from insubordination to a kind of set-up toward which
the supervisor, wittingly or not, had been steering Sumner for months.
Sumner saw the set-up and tried to avoid it, but he was still fired.
This moment is one of the most basic and insidious aspects of racial
subordination, the moment when it becomes clear that any course of
action will be arbitrarily punished. The moment is crushing, an open

designation).
34. Sumner v. Postmaster Gen., No. 86 CIV. 9301(KC), 1989 WL 66674, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June
15, 1989).
35. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 205–08.
36. Id. at 210.
37. Id. at 211. The same move of unearthing ignored facts appears throughout her 1984 decision
reversing the district court’s refusal to order desegregation of the San Jose School District, in Diaz
v. San Jose Unified School District, 733 F.2d 660 (1984).
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invitation to despair, to anomie. The Judge not only sees it, sees that the
district court missed it entirely, she represents that moment in a detail
that reverses the logic of subordination by reversing the perspective that
systematically renders these moments invisible. Maximum
consciousness.
To reconstruct the plaintiff’s experience from the record in this way is
itself humanizing, drawing a counter-narrative to the disgruntled
troublemaker the district court too quickly assumed was before it,
demonstrating that the counter-narrative is in fact the dominant, if not
uncontested, narrative located in the record evidence. This method is
Ellison’s new humanism in action: humble, inquisitive, constitutively
attentive to the fallibility of all human endeavors, and most importantly,
off the merry-go-round of racial perfectionism. The effect is to turn the
law toward democracy, toward equal dignity, not just equal rights—in
short, toward the vindication of promises we have already made.
Thank you, Judge Fletcher. Thank you for being so careful with these
cases. Thank you for bringing maximum consciousness to the law. And
warmest congratulations on thirty years on the bench. I could not be
more honored to have served as your clerk.

